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Down in Davenport:
A Regional Perspective
on Antebellum Town
Economic Development
TIMOTHY R. MAHONEY
IN THE 1850s the river towns of eastern Iowa emerged as
dynamic places that provided goods and services for the wave
of settlers then streaming into Iowa and the West. Believing
that each urban place could develop into both a replica of local
town economies and societies elsewhere and a microcosm of
the larger economy and society as a whole, the founders of
these towns had initially sought to make them the centers of
autonomous local economies. However, the development of a
regional economy, based on the emergence of a hierarchical
urban system, altered the basis of local urban development.
Rather than relying on providing goods and services to their
local hinterlands, towns increasingly felt pressure to broaden
their economic functions v^thin the new urban system in order
to continue developing. In response to heightened competition
from nearby towns, local elites were compelled to formulate
more assertive and ambitious economic strategies. The eco-
nomic elite of these towns came to believe that the town that
could specialize and generate external and transport economies
would broaden the reach of its trade, draw other towns into
dependent economic relationships with it, and emerge as a
significant regional entrepôt. In time, by attracting railroads,
further expanding trade, and establishing new financial con-
tacts with larger cities back east, so it was believed, centrality
elsewhere would migrate farther west and propel the SUG-
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cessful entrepôt city to metropolitan status in the midwestern
urban system.
Then, between 1857 and 1865, something unexpected
happened to the ambitions of one river town after another.
Each town actively sought to attract railroads as the catalysts of
further development and regional control, but their arrival
shifted mercantile connections from St. Louis to Chicago, and
brought agents, branch offices, traveling salesmen, and cata-
logs from the metropolis. Gradually, local manufacturers and
merchants were forced out of business, transshipping activity
moved elsewhere, and the local dynamics of economic devel-
opment atrophied. One by one local economic actions were
drawn into the regional economic dynamics centered at the
metropolis. Forced either to coordinate local economic activity
with or differentiate it from metropolitan activity, the course of
local development fragmented, and change came more slowly
and discontinuously, usually introduced from the outside. As
this happened, those who stayed abandoned their earlier ambi-
tions and goals, and increasingly relied on compromise, adjust-
ment, and rationalization. Rather than acting on their own ini-
tiative, locals tended to respond passively to outside decisions.^
This reorientation to the realities of the new regional sys-
tem pushed the history of many such towns to the side. Life in
these towns seemed to fall behind the pace of regional and
national development, and the local economy seemed no
longer able to keep up with the competition among larger cities,
which increasingly took place at a higher level of functional
specialization and development across the regional system. As
a result, such towns retreated to providing goods and services
to a small local area, an econonnic eddy, a backwater in the
regional system.
Given the metropolitan ambitions of the first generation,
anything short of becoming a metropolis was perceived by resi-
dents and observers alike as failure. Such places were increas-
ingly considered stagnant, redundant, and simple urban places
of little interest. Ignored or treated as a dependent by the
1. Robert H. Wiebe, The Opening of American Society: From the Adoption of the
Constitution to the Eve of Disunion (New York, 1984), 287-90; Jonathan Raban,
Old Glory: An American Voyage (New York, 1981), 193.
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metropolis, some localities responded to relative decline within
the system by ignoring its implications and asserting that local
history still followed the same local linear process of develop-
ment as they thought it always had. They argued that each com-
munity should be judged on its own terms. What would be seen
from a regional perspective as decline or just keeping up was
interpreted locally as progress., No matter that paved streets,
sewer systems, streetcars, or telephones arrived years after their
appearance in the metropolis, each still marked a milestone in
the advance of progress in a town. Local life, viewed out of all
context, became parochialized and isolated from the broader his-
tory of the regional system of which it was a part.
Ironically, the tendency among historians to analyze towns
and communities as case studies of sets of other such towns and
communities reinforced the tendency to view town histories as
individualized and isolated from those of other urban units.
Either way, the real story of these towns, their continual strug-
gle to respond to and interact with the overwhelming power of
the metropolis in the regional system has been understated, if
not ignored, by residents, local historians, and, more recently,
professional historians.
Yet this continual struggle of small and middle-sized towns
and cities in the hinterland to find a useful role within the
metropolitan-dominated regional system is the distinguishing
historical experience of these places. In the nineteenth century
more than half of the towns and cities in modernizing America
experienced urbanization from this hinterland perspective, and
it remains the primary experience of most towns and cities
today. Connecting the history of such towns and cities to the
larger process of regional metropolitan development forces a
reconsideration of these places not as failed towns, but rather as
secondary places within regional systems. In the words of the
urban historian Eric Monkkonen, they "enhanced agriculture,
fed the larger cities, [and] helped build a rich network of trans-
portation and manufacturing throughout the country" by serv-
ing place-specific functions within the larger process of
regional urbanization and development.^
2. Eric Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities
and Towns, 1780-1980 (Berkeley, CA, 1988), 24-26, 123.
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From the beginning, the history of each tow n^ w^ as shaped
by the ways tov^nspeople responded to the shifting realities of
the regional economic system. Because this development dove-
tailed w i^th the rapid growth of one or two urban centers,
responses were necessarily directed at competing or interacting
with larger cities. Each town's response shaped the continuing
character of its economic and social development and structure.
Their responses formed the tenuous thread connecting succes-
sive generations and giving each town's history a plot and some
direction, albeit not always positive.^
The plot inevitably involved a complex interaction be-
tween perceptions, assumptions, expectations, actions, and sys-
temic reality. That interaction, as it played out in the relatively
well-documented early history of Davenport, Iowa, is the focus
of this article. Told from this perspective, the story adds new
meaning and broader comparative significance to the local his-
torical perspective. By shovdng how Davenport's merchants
and entirepreneurs developed economic sti"ategies in a regional
context and thus shaped the distinctive historical experience of
the town, one can begin to understand the relationship
between economic and social actions and strategies and how
their interaction contiibuted to the evolution of a distinctive
social milieu in Davenport.
LOCATION, in Davenport's case, had much to do v^th its des-
tiny. The first traders and trappers who moved north on the
river quickly recognized the potential significance of the area
when they encountered, in rapid succession, a great bend east-
ward in the river channel, the mouth of the Rock River on the
east bank of the river. Rock Island sitting in the nüddle of the
river a bit farther upriver, and the lower end of the upper rapids
of the Mississippi just above the island. The rapids seemed a
natural break in river tiravel, while the island or the elevated
banks on the west seemed a secure place to establish a post with
contact wdth the Rock and upper Mississippi river valleys. The
presence of a considerable settlement of Sauk Indians just up
3. Ron Powers, White Town Drowsing (Boston, 1986), 20-34.
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the Rock River further attested to the strategic importance of
the site.
Between 1808 and 1816 the American government estab-
lished four forts on the upper Mississippi River: Fort Madison,
established in 1808 but evacuated and burned in 1813; Fort
Edwards at the lower rapids near the mouth of the Des Moines
River and the later site of Warsaw, Illinois, in 1810; Fort
Crawford, at the site of Prairie du Chien at the mouth of the
Wisconsin River in 1815; and Fort Armstrong on Rock Island in
1816. A few years later Fort Snelling was built near the site of
St. Paul. Although it would be an exaggeration to describe the
placement of these forts as a system, it is clear that military and
civilian personnel on the upper Mississippi did occasionally
move from fort to fort, and that there was a regular pattern of
supply from St. Louis to the north, touching at each of the forts.
Each in itself, however, was only an outpost, supplied from the
outside with food, stores, and goods to trade with the sur-
rounding Indian population. The forts were not necessarily
'spearheads of urbanization," for only Fort Madison and Fort
Crawford developed into actual town sites. Those involved in
supplying or occupying the upper Mississippi River forts did,
however, naturally acquire a sense of geography and knowl-
edge of the territory. That knowledge may have enabled them
to make informed locational choices when the wave of Ameri-
can settlement hit, land prices became tied into a land market,
and investors, each hoping to make a profit, scattered town
sites across the upper river valley.*
George Davenport, Sr., for example, successfully maneu-
vered within the outpost and fort system and then used the
knowledge thus gained to his advantage when settlement and
urban development began to interact in the 1830s. As early as
4. The History of Lee County, Iowa (Chicago, 1879), 327-31, 590-91; Nelson
C. Roberts and S. W. Moorhead, eds.. Story of Lee County, Iowa, 2 vols. (Chi-
cago, 1914), 1:113-21. Franc B. Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present (Daven-
port, 1858), 150-51; Bruce E. Mahan, Old Fort Crawford and the Frontier (Iowa
City, 1926), 34-48; History of Dubuque County, Iowa (Chicago, 1880), 152-56;
David Wishart, The Fur Trade of the American West, 1807-1840: A Geographical
Synthesis (Lincoln, NE, 1979); Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer
Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville, and St. Louis (Chi-
cago, 1959), 1.
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1814 Davenport, acting as an agent for the American Fur Com-
pany, was supplying upriver forts from St. Louis. In late 1815
he was present at the construction of Fort Armstrong. The next
year he opened a trading post at the fort. By 1818, however,
Davenport had apparently moved out of the fort and estab-
lished his own independent trading post elsewhere on the
island. Meanwhile, he had established a series of temporary
posts across the central valley to trade with the Sauk and Mes-
quakie Indians (known to the federal government as the com-
bined Sac and Fox tribes) and, further north, the Sioux.^
Davenport also became the first white person since the
death of Julien Dubuque in 1810 to gain the trust of the
Mesquakie Indians who extracted lead from the mines around
Dubuque and Galena. Davenport's efforts to become the broker
for the trade between the Indians and St. Louis merchants were
hindered by the actions of competitors, in particular the futile
efforts of Col. John Smith of St. Louis to forcibly wrest control
of the mines from the Indians. Nevertheless, by 1818 Daven-
port had begun to ship lead south to St. Louis.*
In 1819 a number of settlers arrived in the lead region.
Several more groups followed in 1820, and in 1821, amid a
national recession, a wave of settlers ventured north along the
river and established uncertain claims to the mines around
Galena, Illinois. That same year Davenport himself sent an
associate, Amos Farrar, to set up a permanent trading post at
Galena, thus establishing the town as the entrepôt of the lead
region and a significant regional outpost north of St. Louis.^
In 1821 the regional cluster of settlements and economic
development concentrated around St. Louis was just then mov-
ing north past the newly established town of Quincy into
Adams County and the lower Military Tract. The development
5. Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present, 150-55.
6. Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present, 155-57; J. Thomas Scharf, History of St.
Louis City and County, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, 1883), 1:187; Jacob Van der Zee,
"Early History of Lead Mining in the Iowa Country," Iowa lournal of History
and Politics 13 (1915), 3-32, 41.
7. Bernard H. Schockel, "The Settlement and Development of Jo Daviess
County, Illinois," in Arthur C. Trowbridge and Eugene W. Shaw, ed.. The
Geology and Geography of the Galena and Elizabeth Quadrangle (Urbana, IL,
1916), 184; Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present, 156.
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of a cluster of settlements in the lead region and the establish-
ment of Galena as the endpoint of an outpost economy north of
St. Louis established a geographical pattern of economic devel-
opment in the central part of the upper Mississippi River valley.
These two areas of rapid development at either end of the
regional system were connected, after 1823, by a developing
transport system. Between them, the valley between Quincy
and Galena took on the concerns of an in-between place.^
After Fort Armstrong lost its outpost or break-of-bulk eco-
nomic function to Galena about 1825, newly arriving entrepre-
neurs and traders in the central part of the valley had to settle
for developing some intermediary role in the entrenched
regional outpost system. Those interested in establishing towns
or cities thought in terms of supplying steamboats with food
and fuel, travelers with a place to rest, and merchants and ships
udth a place to store or transfer goods or break large shipments
into smaller, more local ones. In each case, the establishment
and future success of a town or city was justified, encouraged,
advertised, and predicted on the strength of its proximity to
either of the rapids or its convenient location halfway between
St. Louis and the lead region.'
When the wave of settlement finally pushed north into the
central valley, the stretch of the river between the rapids
became a hotly contested area for town development. As early
as 1819 guidebooks pointed to the area's promise. By the early
thirties, locational advantages were amplified by the growing
awareness that the richness of the soil along and behind the
river banks increased as one progressed north along the river. i°
Hence, earlier perceptions intersected with the line of first set-
8. Theodore L. Carlson, The Illinois Military Tract: A Study in Land Occupa-
tion, Utilization, and Tenure (Urbana, IL, 1951), 2-3; William V. Pooley, "The
Settlement of Illinois from 1830 to 1850," Bulletin of the University of Wiscon-
sin, History ser. 1 (May 1908), 400.
9. Ronald Rayman, "The Black Hawk Purchase: Stimulus to Settlement of
Iowa, 1832-1851,° Western Illinois Regional Studies 3 (Fall 1980), 141-53.
10. Edmund Dana, Geographical Sketches on the Western Country; Designed for
Emigrants and Settlers (Cincinnati, 1819), 134-37, 146-47, 297-98; Edmund
Dana, A Description of the Bounty Lands in the State of Illinois; Also the Princi-
pal Roads and Routes, by Land and Water through the Territory of the United
States (Cincinnati, 1819), 5-9.
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tlement and a speculative regional economy to touch off urban
land speculation between the rapids, especially within twenty
miles of the vacant site of Fort Armstrong.
In the apparently chaotic, random progression of town
development in this area, those who had been involved in the
earlier trading and fort system had a distinct advantage. They
initially chose most of the best sites, leaving less advantageous
sites for newcomers and outsiders. George Davenport's post on
Rock Island was, not surprisingly, a springboard from which
several early town founders started. Davenport's early associ-
ates included Russell Farnham, the founder of Rock Island in
1826; John Vanatta, founder of Keithsburg, Illinois, in 1827 and
Muscatine in 1835; Antoine LeClaire, an interpreter at the fort
and one of Davenport's founders; Benjamin Clark, the founder
of Buffalo in 1833; and James Bourne, the first settler near the
site of Clinton in 1836. Davenport's son, Ceorge L., crossed
over to Iowa in 1832 to claim a townsite near Davenport, as did
two other relatives, who laid out Rockingham in 1836." Mean-
while, newcomers to the region, responding to the initial inter-
est by locals and to guidebook advice, filled the areas in
between these fledgling towns with at least twenty more town-
sites before 1860.
The intense interest of town developers in the area
between the rapids is evident from the numbers of towns
founded or platted out. Most developers apparently believed
that a significant town or city would develop somewhere about
halfway between Caleña and St. Louis. At a general level,
therefore, action seems initially to have reflected assumptions.
The situation soon became more complex, however. The chang-
ing dynamics of the regional urban system altered local experi-
ence. Assumptions and other ideas about what was possible or
desirable had to be adjusted to fit that experience, and actions,
in turn, took on new forms.
ll.Pooley, "Settlement of Illinois," 423; History of Mercer County, Illinois
(Chicago, 1882), 46-47, 118; A. T. Andreas, Illustrated Historical Atlas of the
State of Iowa, 1875 (Chicago, 1875), 426-27, 449, 484; A History of Scott
County, Iowa (Chicago, 1882), 122; Sylvester W. McMaster, Sixty Years on the
Upper Mississippi: My life and Experiences (Rock Island, 1890), 90; Willard
Barrows, "History of Scott County, Iowa," Annals of Imua 1 (1863; reprint,
Iowa City, 1964), 42, 97, 21.
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Initially, most of the towns between the rapids seem to
have been competing for the secondary role of entrepôt for
eastern Iowa, nothing more. At the time, the regional urban
system was clearly organized as an outpost economy. All new
towns somehow had to find a useful niche within that prear-
ranged structure. As the wave of regional settlement swept into
eastern Iowa after 1850, this arrangement faced increasing
pressure and began to show signs of being stretched to the
limit. Consequently, the larger towns along the river temporar-
ily abandoned the passive strategies of economic integration
within a system for more independent strategies such as direct
competition, import substitution, specialization, or entrepôt
bypassing.
In the 1850s Davenport in particular aimed its sights
higher, seeking more than secondary status, and even, perhaps,
a role as entrepôt for the entire region. All the while, however,
the forces at work were really reinforcing, not undermining, the
power of the existing regional entrepôts. New assumptions,
buoyed by economic expansion and distorted by speculation,
elicited new actions, blinding locals to the reality of new
regional metropolitan dynamics of urbanization, dynamics that
would, in time, compel secondary towns to retreat to more pas-
sive strategies of survival through integration in a regional
urban ^
THE SHIFTING CHARACTER of the economic strategies of
Davenport's merchants and entrepreneurs was best character-
ized by the career of Antoine LeClaire. LeClaire was the half-
breed son of a French fur tirapper and a Potawatomie woman,
and, since 1822, the husband of the granddaughter of a
Potawatomie chief. His power in the region was rooted in the
treaty of 1832 ending the Black Hawk War. By the terms of the
treaty the Sauk and Mesquakie Indians ceded the land for fifty
miles west of the Mississippi River. In return for his services as
12. Timothy R. Mahoney, River Towns in the Great West: The Structure of Pro-
vincial Urbanization in the American Midwest, 1820-1870 (Cambridge and
New York, 1990), 105, fig. 4.1; John D. Haeger, "The Abandoned Townsite on
the Midwestern Frontier: A Case Study of Rockwell, Illinois," Journal of the
Early Republic 3 (1983), 165-83.
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an interpreter during the war and earlier, LeClaire received
three large land grants on the banks of the river in the yicinity
of Fort Armstrong. The first grant, at the future site of Moline,
Illinois, had been acquired in 1829 and then disputed by the
Indians, leading to the Black Hawk War; the other two were
across the river, one near the future site of LeClaire and the
other just east of the future site of Davenport. Aware of the
potential value of the third grant, LeClaire decided to focus his
energies on it. In 1832 he and his wife crossed the river and
established residence there. In the ensuing year, using his land
as collateral, he gradually bought out early claimants who held
large blocks of land to the west of his own. In late. 1835 he sold
a large tract of land to the west of his original grant to the pro-
prietors of the newly founded town to be called Davenport.
Later he joined them to establish a broad plat for the new
town. ^ 3
An unenthusiastic response to the public sale of town lots
in 1835 and 1836 convinced LeClaire, Davenport, and other
newcomers that more needed to be done to draw attention to
the new town. After all, in mid-183 6, Davenport was but one of
many towns in the vicinity vying for the role of local depot and
thus the primary urban center in the middle of the valley. First,
the founders sought to acquire political centrality in the county,
that is, to secure the county seat.
The major initial contender was Buffalo, a town estab-
lished downriver a few years earlier. Given the contemporary
expectation that county seats should lie near the center of a
county, Buffalo's location closer to the center of Scott County
weighed heavily in its favor. To counteract this advantage,
LeClaire, unable to change the location of his town and unwill-
ing to start another elsewhere (due to Davenport's other
locational advantages), sought to relocate Davenport to the
center of the county by having the county line moved upriver.
As it happened, LeClaire's interests corresponded with those of
Dr. John Reynolds, a legislator from Muscatine County. As
13. J. W. Spencer, "Renuniscences of Pioneer Life in the Mississippi Valley," in
Milo Milton Quaife, ed.. The Early Day of Rock Island and Davenport: The Nar-
ratives of}. W. Spencer and}. M. D. Burrows (Chicago, 1942), 43; Barrows, "His-
tory of Scott County," 40-44,58-59; Davenport Democrat, 15 February 1873.
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founder of Geneva, a town a few miles upriver from Bloom-
ington (later Muscatine), Reynolds faced a similar problem.
LeClaire and Reynolds thus pooled their resources and power
to convince legislators to move the Scott-Muscatine county line
upriver, thereby placing both Davenport and Geneva nearer the
center of their respective counties.'*
As a result of these maneuvers, the competition then
focused on Davenport's nearby, larger (as late as 1838) neigh-
bor, Rockingham. A series of elections for the county seat was
marred by repeated fraud by both sides and the inevitable
demands for recounts. By the time the territorial legislature
intervened in 1838, economic geography and LeClaire's estab-
lishment of a ferry line across the river in 1836 had decided the
outcome. John Burrows later remarked that while charge and
countercharge flew back and forth for two years, Davenport
simply passed Rockingham by in both "population and capi-
tal," causing even some Rockingham residents to "desert to
the enemy." The discovery that Rockingham's wharf, unlike
Davenport's, lay below the spring flood level also worked to its
considerable disadvantage. Moreover, Davenport's expanding
capital enabled its citizens to offer to build a substantial court-
house "equal to the court-house across the river, at Stephenson,
Thus Davenport carried the day. Soon it emerged as the
depot along the Great Bend of the Mississippi and began to
connect itself to regional channels of trade. In that regional con-
text it would eventually find new competitors for the status
of subregional entrepôt. That cornpetition would require
Davenport's elite to adopt new, broader strategies of action to
achieve their goals.
In the meantime, LeClaire continued to consolidate his
control of the town by manipulating the land market, and fur-
ther encouraging local economic development. Land sales had
14. Andreas, Historical Atlas, 426-27.
15. Ibid.; J. W. Parker to Thomas McKnight, 14 March 1838, Thomas
McKnight Papers, State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa; J. M. D.
Burrows, "Fifty Years in Iowa: Being the Personal Reminiscences of J. M. D.
Burrows," in Quaife, Early Day, 121-22; Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present,
221-23, 233.
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remained sluggish on the Davenport plat. Because of some
uncertainty about the legitimacy of the proprietors' deed, they
were unable to transfer land fee simple to prospective purchas-
ers. But LeCIaire, who had full title to his land by treaty rights,
could circumvent the confusion of territorial laws and ti-ansfer
immediate title to newcomers. So in 1839 he decided to plat out
the First Addition as an independent proprietor. Within a few
weeks, land sales began to concentirate in the area along Main
and Brady streets behind LeClaire's wharf, which he had built
the same year to draw steamboat tiraffic to the site. Every two
years for the next fifteen years LeCIaire opened new additions,
moving up the bluffs from the original plat. Antoine LeCIaire
thus became Davenport's dominant proprietor.!^
LeCIaire continued to add to his influence in the commu-
nity By 1840 the LeCIaire House, the hotel he had built in
1838, had become a popular resort for southerners. In 1841 he
made extensive land grants to schools and churches to encour-
age their constiüiction. He also seems to have built housing for
prospective settlers, either renting or selling the dwellings
depending on the circumstances. According to one biographer,
he "improved the city by a liberal expenditure of a large income,
in erecting churches and other public buildings." Improvements
scattered about the city memorialized his generosity. !''
Although there is little concrete evidence concerning
LeClaire's involvement in real estate and building, it did draw
comment from contemporary observers. One traveler from
Dubuque noted that Davenport in the mid-fifties seemed much
more built up than Dubuque, even though both were about the
same size. "This is owing to its being owned (or at least three-
fourths of it) by a Frenchman named LeCIaire who is deter-
mined to have a town there. It requires, however, something
besides buildings to make a place important and that something
is not in Mr. LeClaire's power to b ' ^ ^
16. Barrows, "History of Scott County," 58-59, 64, 68, 74-76.
17. History of Scott County, Iowa, 609; [H. A. Porter], Rock Island and Its Sur-
roundings in 1853 (Rock Island, 1854), 27.
18. Diary of William I. Barney, Dubuque, Iowa, State Historical Society of
Iowa, Iowa City.
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LECLAIRE, of course, was aware that a town was more than a
plat, a wharf, buildings, churches, and public institutions. The
town needed a market orientation capable of expanding from
local to subregional exchange and specialization. The first mer-
chants who arrived in town in the late thirties set out to accom-
plish that goal.
By 1835 Davenport had become a stop on the steamboat
route between St. Louis and Caleña. By that time eleven boats
regularly negotiated the upper river. ^^ At first, the steamboats
merely dropped off immigrants and goods from St. Louis and
continued on to St. Louis or Caleña without taking on any
freight. As Scott County's population continued to grow, how-
ever, early Davenport settlers, whether merchants or not, began
to feel the inevitable demands from newcomers to provide spe-
cialized market and craft services.
As early as 1838 several of the one hundred or so townspeo-
ple had begun to specialize as merchants or peddlers. David A.
Burrows began pedaling fruits and vegetables in 1839. The next
year his brother John "laid in a supply of goods" from his cousin
in Cincinnati and became the town's first permanent merchant.
By the year's end local farmers had exhausted his supply of gro-
ceries. The next year he added dry goods to his stock and began
to extend credit to local farmers. In some cases he even filled in
for absent bankers, holding money deposits for clients until they
wished to apply them to the purchase of goods, or sometimes
transmitting them to St. Louis merchants.^"
By 1839 Burrows's business had begun, by his account, to
attract trade from Clinton and Jackson counties, as well as
throughout Scott County. In 1840, to the surprise of the four
other merchants in town. Burrows also began to buy produce,
grain, and livestock from the nearby farming population, which
had already begun to produce surpluses. In the next two years
he commenced selling produce upriver at Fort Crawford and
Fort Snelling and at Potosi, Wisconsin, hence tying into the
arrangement Davenport had been a part of a decade earlier. In
1841 he acquired contracts for the fort trade. This required him
to purchase larger amounts of grain, livestock, and produce
19. Scharf, History of St. Louis, 2:1102.
20. Burrows, "Fifty Years in Iowa," in Quaife, Early Day, 142-44.
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from area farmers. By the end of the year, Burrows's trade, and
thus Davenport's influence, extended to Clinton, Jackson,
Cedar, and Linn counties, and into the trading territory of Rock
Island across the river.^ ^
By 1843, having exhausted demand in the north. Burrows
turned his sights to regional markets in St. Louis and New
Orleans. Twice he attempted to use f latboats to send produce
downriver to New Orleans. By Í845, however. Burrows found
St. Louis the preferable market. With credit from St. Louis
entrepreneurs. Burrows and others began to extend their credit
arrangements with farmers across a broader hinterland, and
thus established Davenport's position as a central place be-
tween St. Louis wholesalers and the newly settled farms of
eastern Iowa.^ ^
Davenport consolidated its regionally oriented function in
the middle of the valley in the middle 1840s, when wheat
shortages in Europe led to high prices and a wheat boom for
American farmers. By the middle of the decade, with more than
four hundred steamboats arriving every year, local merchants
sent an average of about thirty thousand bushels of wheat into
the regional market. Although this was less than half the
amount exported from Quincy and Alton downriver, it did
approximate the levels at Burlington and Dubuque, and it out-
stripped the volume of trade at Muscatine, Rock Island, and
Clinton, Davenport's nearest competitors. Apparently a kind of
subregional shakeout in the market had begun to consolidate
the wheat trade in a few major centers upriver.^ ^
Davenport's competitive advantage was based on its loca-
tion just below the upper rapids on the Creat Bend of the river
and far enough north to avoid Quincy's trading power. Mer-
chants in towns above the rapids were forced to pay lower
prices than those in towns below the rapids, thus giving Daven-
port a competitive draw in markets as far north as the back-
21. Ibid., 149-54, 163-69.
22. Ibid., 182-85, 187-88, 192-95.
23. Davenport Gazette, 5 January 1843, 10 June 1847, 6 December 1849;
Harry E. Downer, History of Davenport and Scott County, Iowa, 2 vols. (Chi-
cago, 1910), 1:193; Barrows, "History of Scott County," 114; Mahoney, River
Towns in the Great West, 189-91.
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country of Dubuque. In 1848 a Dubuque editor complained
that Davenport and Muscatine merchants were drawing off a
"large portion" of our trade, "just because proprietors of these
establishments were paid better prices for their grain than
could be received here.'^* Towns to the south of Davenport
were adversely affected by the similar economic and geo-
graphic advantages of Keokuk and Quincy. Those towns were
powerless to prevent Keokuk from drawing off as much as 25
percent of their potential local trade. Davenport was far enough
north of Quincy, by contrast, that Quincy merchants were
unable to draw off much of its trade. Thus Davenport was able
to increase its draw from the north while maintaining the
boundaries of its previous hinterlands to the south.^^ In each
case, Davenport's expansion was aided by a surge in the market
price of wheat. At the same time, the relatively stable cost of
transportation allowed farmers to carry wheat greater distances
than they could have before the price rise.
Import substitution further enhanced Davenport's eco-
nomic position in the regional system. In 1848 Ambrose Fulton,
John Burrows, and Henry Prettyman, one of Burrows's associ-
ates, tapped into Davenport's suddenly rich resource base by
simultaneously constructing flour mills in town. By producing
flour for local consumption and export, the mills ended the
town's dependence on flour milled at St. Louis, Quincy, or
Dubuque, the latter two places having acquired mills a few
years earlier. Such import substituting reduced the local cost of
flour, eliminated payments made abroad for transportation and
supplies, created some jobs and local demand for manufactur-
ing supplies, and contributed to the development of local eco-
nomic centrality, thus enhancing the town's larger economic
role in the regional system.^ ^
In such an economic and geographic eddy, Davenport was
able by about 1850 to broaden its role and carve out a signifi-
24. Dubuque Miner's Express, 19 December 1848. '
25. Delegates to the Chicago Harbor and River Convention, The Commerce
and Navigation of the Mississippi, and also that appertaining to the city of St.
Louis, considered with reference to the improvement, by the general government,
of the Mississippi and its principal tributaries (St. Louis, 1847), 18-22; Keokuk
Whig and Register, 17 September 1847.
26. Burrows, "Fifty Years in Iowa," in Quaife, Early Day, 208-14.
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cant status as a central place or secondary entrepôt within a
rapidly integrating regional economic, urban system. In the
next decade Davenport's efforts were reinforced by the conver-
gence of three regional economic and geographic developments
across its immediate hinterland. The wheat market soared due
to European demand. This occurred just as a wave of immi-
grants was moving into central Iowa, causing a rapid increase in
agricultural production. As a result, Davenport became as
attractive to migrants as its rivals. Galena and Quincy. Its popu-
lation increased steadily from about nine hundred in 1845 to
three thousand in 1851 and ten thousand in 1856. The counties
around it showed a corresponding increase. At the same time,
farmers across Davenport's hinterland, responding to local cli-
matic conditions, the cost of transport, and the supply and
demand dynamics of the regional market at St. Louis, decided
to plant wheat. That development consolidated and drew far-
ther north across the central part of the valley a small "wheat
belt" that had developed downriver in the 1840s on the north-
ern fringe of a concentrated area of corn and hog production
around St. Louis. In response, Davenport merchants marketed
more and more wheat into the regional market at St. Louis. The
credit earned by this marketing with St. Louis bankers enabled
Davenport merchants to purchase more wholesale supplies for
their stores from St. Louis or the East to supply the rising popu-
lation. The connections with St. Louis and the regional market
also enabled them to establish Davenport as a significant mer-
chandising depot.2^
By the mid-1850s, the convergence of these events trans-
formed Davenport into the boom town of eastern Iowa and the
Great West. As that happened, local attitudes concerning the
town's role in the regional system and its economic future
began to change as well. No longer did local control satisfy the
ambitions of many of the towns' most important merchants.
Rather, they became convinced that Davenport should play a
more central role in the economic development of the valley.
27. Mahoney, River Towns in the Great West, 203-4,179-82; Downer, History
of Davenport and Scott County, 1:174,190,194,198, 208; Directory of the City
of Davenport for 1856, '57 (Davenport, 1856), 133.
Down in Davenport ' 467
perhaps, in time, becoming the entrepôt of the upper Missis-
sippi and trans-Mississippi West.
THE BROAD STRATEGY designed to achieve this end
involved efforts on several fronts. All of these efforts under-
mined local control of economic and social actions and sub-
jected the town to increasing control by outsiders.^* Most
directly related to changes in regional dynamics was the effort
to capitalize on railroad development. Local merchants,
responding to growing pressures in the steamboat system,
launched a concerted effort to draw the railroad to Davenport.
With that accomplished, they went out of their way to support
the construction of a bridge over the Mississippi River and to
secure a right-of-way through the town. The railroad policy
pursued by the town's elite evolved from perceptions about the
shifting dynamics of the regional trading system, from possible
misperceptions about a subtle short-term shift in the local econ-
omy's activity in the grain trade, and, finally, from the
unencumbered investment portfolios of the elite, which en-
abled them to act, economically and politically, to achieve what
they wanted.
Throughout the late forties and early fifties settlement
continued to shift north and west, filling in eastern Iowa and
causing significant increases in the farming population. With
the grain markets already in place, therefore, pressure gradu-
ally increased to handle more and more trade. In the early fif-
ties the beginnings of a sustained price increase in the market,
accompanied by stable transport costs, extended the range
from which grain could be carried to market, increased intercity
competition, and thus, on the basis of previous advantages,
enlarged the hinterlands of Quincy and Davenport. In the
south, Quincy merchants were able to cut significantly into the
trade of Keokuk, Fort Madison, and even Muscatine. Daven-
port, however, still lay too far north, protected by the rapids and
distance from Quincy merchants, so Davenport merchants did
not find it necessary to expend energy protecting their trade.
28. See Timothy R. Mahoney, "Down in Davenport: The Social Response of
Antebelluni Elites to Regional Urbanization," Annals of Iowa 50 (Fall 1990),
forthconiiing.
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Instead, they aggressively went out and broadened their con-
tacts. By 1856 farmers south and west of Muscatine and east of
Rock Island, as well as some behind Clinton, Bellevue, and
even Dubuque were bringing grain to Davenport. Davenport
merchants were also doing business throughout Henry County,
Illinois, and as far west as Fort Des Moines. As a result, while
receipts leveled off behind Quincy by 1855, they continued to
soar at Davenport and Dubuque; each town was inundated
with nearly a million bushels of wheat in 1857. That this
increase occurred during a period of rising prices which peaked
in 1854 only accentuated the economic boom and pressure on
Davenport.^'
Curiously, however, flour and wheat exports from Daven-
port, Dubuque, and other towns between the rapids to St. Louis
or, after 1854, Chicago did not increase. St. Louis felt the impact
of this development immediately. Between 1842 and 1854 the
upper Mississippi River valley's share of total grain receipts at
the St. Louis market dropped from 42 percent to less than 25
percent. This decline might have been due partly to fires that
reduced the milling capacity of Keokuk, Quincy, and Hannibal,
Missouri, but at Davenport the mills continued to increase flour
production.^" The rising population of the interior probably
demanded most of Davenport's flour production, turning the
city into a flour producer and shipper as well as a hinterland
grain depot.
This short-term change had a significant effect on local
economic perceptions and activity. Having a locational advan-
tage over St. Louis producers in the hinterland flour market,
Davenport merchants purchased local wheat and, rather than
milling what was needed and shipping the surplus to St. Louis,
milled as much as they could and sold it back into the hinter-
land. Credits that once flowed into St. Louis bank accounts
from the proceeds of Davenport's surplus grain sales now
stayed at home in local banks. Thus, Davenport merchants no
longer felt obliged to use St. Louis credits to purchase goods in
the regional entrepôt. Instead, they had the freedom to acquire
29. Mahoney, River Towns in the Great West, 161-62, 192-94.
30. Ibid., 192-95; Scharf, History of St. Louis, 1126.
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their goods wherever they wished.^' This freedom enhanced
their sense of local independence and centrality.
This growing sense of Davenport's centrality wathin the
hinterland may have further fueled the city's already high
interest in railroads. Davenport merchants, like those elsewhere
above the rapids, had become increasingly frustrated with
steamboat transportation. As the volume of trade increased at
Davenport and other ports while the number of steamboats
operating on the river increased only slightly, traffic problems
intensified, transport rates rose, and the burden of the extra
cost of the rapids became greater. Upriver merchants and farm-
ers were further discouraged because the St. Louis market
tended to be already glutted before the products from the Dav-
enport hinterland could reach the market. The farther north
one went along the river, therefore, the greater the frustration
with the steamboat system.^ ^
The railroad was also seen as a possible way for Daven-
port's elite to gain some control over transportation to and from
the city. In the steamboat trade they had made no progress in
breaking the monopoly held by St. Louis and Galena mer-
chants in owning and running the extensive system of steam-
boats on the upper river. Ironically, however, this lack of invest-
ment in steamboats left Davenport's elite, unlike Galena's,
unencumbered by previous commitments, and thus better able
to respond quickly to investment ventures.
Given the contemporary condition of the market, Chicago
looked very good from eastern Iowa. Because Chicago was
closer to the East, its market tended to be higher than St.
Louis's. It was also closer to eastern Iowa and thus offered other
trading advantages if transport could be found. Likewise, entre-
preneurs in Chicago watched as the wheat belt moved north-
ward behind Davenport and Burlington, eyeing this develop-
ment as a potential rich harvest for the city's ambitions for grain
trading.
Frustration combined, then, with ambition, to propel
Davenport's elite headlong into the railroad excitement of the
era. Ironically, Davenport's railroad policy emerged from a
31. Mahoney, River Towns in the Great West, 195.
32. Ibid., 159-60.
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growing concern about the need to improve the rapids so as to
reduce the "toll" being paid by merchants and farmers alike to
the freight company owned by merchants in St. Louis and
Galena. At a regional convention held at Davenport in Septem-
ber 1849 to discuss the improvement of the rapids and to for-
mulate a general transportation strategy for Iowa in anticipa-
tion of a larger transportation convention the following month
at St. Louis, Davenport delegates preferred to discuss the devel-
opment of a strategy for acquiring railroad connections.^^
Alfred Sanders, a close associate of Antoine LeClaire,
expressed LeClaire's view that more reliance on the river would
not enable Davenport to secure a transport connection suffi-
cient to alter their economic position in the current system. "It is
undoubtedly ti:ne,'' he remarked, "that the improvement of the
rapids would advance the interests of every resident of Iowa,
but how little when compared to the advantages they would
reap from the intersection of the state by a great national rail-
road." The delegates apparently agreed, for they resolved that
Davenport should raise a large subscription, the funds from
which would be used to encourage the selection of Rock Island,
Illinois, as the destination of the proposed railroad out of Chi-
cago. LeClaire offered to run the subscription, and, in time,
offered twenty-five thousand dollars to secure Davenport's
interests. Perhaps suspecting the hidden agenda of the Daven-
port convention, few members of the state's steamboat interest
showed up. A month later at the St. Louis convention, where
delegates met to discuss the choice of the route for a national
cross-country railroad, the two interests openly clashed when
Alfred Sanders publicly criticized a delegate from Keokuk who
sought to represent his town's river interests as those of the
entire state.^* Meanwhile, Keokuk's merchants and enti-epre-
neurs continued to fight for improvement of the rapids, while
looking on aghast as the Rock Island Railroad Company was
incorporated and began building toward Rock Island in 1852.
In between, the residents of Muscatine recognized the advan-
tages of a railroad, but doubted that a railroad connection to
Davenport would help them, so they refused to cooperate.
33. St. Louis Republican, 7-14 October 1849.
34. Ibid.; Davenport Gazette, 13 September, 1, 8, November 1849.
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As the railroad approached Rock Island in 1853, Daven-
port supporters pooled the money necessary to begin construc-
tion of a road west from Davenport. Soon thereafter LeClaire
offered the Rock Island Railroad Company a right-of-way
through town, made his house available as a depot, and
encouraged several investors to build hotels nearer to the sta-
tion to meet the anticipated rush of travelers into Davenport.
Not surprisingly, when the first locomotive was shipped across
the river and put on tracks going west, it was called the Antoine
LeClaire and emblazoned with a shield containing his portrait.^^
By 1854 the new railroad had reached Rock Island. After
two years of construction, it crossed the bridge—the first to
span the Mississippi River—into Davenport, establishing the
Davenport depot as the railhead on the new western line out of
Chicago. Thus the economic orientation of the town shifted
dramatically to the East. Within eighteen months, two-thirds of
the produce once sent from Davenport to St. Louis was diverted
by rail to Chicago. What perhaps surprised Davenporters was
that much of this produce was now raw materials just being
shipped to Chicago through Davenport, rather than being
milled or processed there. Instead of becoming a center of local
trade and production, town merchants and entrepreneurs
quickly saw the development of a simple transshipping func-
tion, with its limited opportunities for agglomeration. Likewise,
old mercantile arrangements with St. Louis were thrown over
for new ones with Chicago and New York.
At the same time, Davenport was flooded with entrepre-
neurs, agents, and capitalists from the East and Chicago inter-
ested in opening branches of wholesaling houses or in found-
ing processing plarits and manufacturing establishments to
supply the newly acquired markets. Local craft shops, brewer-
ies, flour mills, and foundries succumbed to competition from
newcomers or outsiders; even Antoine LeClaire's foundry was
among those forced out of business.^^ Trade may have been up.
35. Rock Island and Its Surroundings, 27; Downer, History of Davenport and
Scott County, Iowa, 726-27; Barrows, "History of Scott County," 119-20;
Wilkie, Davenport, Past and Present, 114-22; City Journal, City Council Pro-
ceedings (Davenport, 1862), 15 September 1858.
36. Manufacturing Census Schedules, Seventh Census of the United States,
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investment was up, the total amount of manufacturing had
nearly tripled, but the town's exports remained about the same.
The hotel business and packet business to Davenport for travel-
ers did increase, but steamboat arrivals and trade on the wharf
declined to less than half of their earlier levels.^ ^ The function
of the town seemed strangely disoriented, on the verge of being
gutted by outside interests. Rather than having its centrality
reinforced by the railroad, Davenport was becoming an outpost
of the metropolis.
The crash of 1859 in Davenport, which caused the finan-
cial failure of several of the most important merchants in town,
and even hurt Antoine LeCIaire, left the economic leadership of
the town in a shambles during a period of significant functional
change. While the old economic elite sought to recoup, or sim-
ply survive, newcomers took over and established railhead
trading arrangements with Chicago. Later, Davenport briefly
enjoyed some success in the lumber milling business, the logs
brought downriver by rafts from Wisconsin and Minnesota. But
Dubuque and Burlington had better rail connections to the
West and thus drew off much of the lumber trade. When the
railroads moved farther west into Iowa after the Ciyil War,
many of the functions associated with the railhead moved west
with them, making Davenport just an important stop along the
line. By the late 1860s, therefore, Davenport had retreated into
the role of a local specialized manufacturing and trade center.^ ^
THE EFFORTS by Davenport's economic elite to expand the
town's role in the regional system in the 1840s and 1850s ulti-
mately became a lesson in the dynamics of power within such
systems. They started from scratch and nursed the town
through various frontier stages of economic development to
become a central place entrepôt for market fanners across east
central Iowa. Then they developed strategies of action based on
1850, Scott County, Iowa; ibid.. Eighth Census of the United States, 1860;
Rock Island and Its Surroundings, 28-32.
37. Davenport City Directory, 1858.
38. Agnes M. Larson, History of the White Pine Industry in Minnesota (Minne-
apolis, 1949), 105,107,122,125; Walter A. Blair, A Raft Pilot's Log: A History
of the Great Rafting Industry on the Upper Mississippi, 1840-1915 (Cleveland,
1930), 256-65.
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independent, local theories of economic growth and develop-
ment. For them, establishing connections with St. Louis,
encouraging outside investment in local activity, actively seek-
ing to substitute imports, financing railroad construction across
the river, and establishing new trading contacts with eastern
markets were actions designed to increase Davenport's central-
ity. Such actions would, they believed, trigger and intensify the
local dynamics of economic development, first by creating a
threshold of local demand to encourage development of local
trade and manufacturing, then, through economies of scale, by
creating external economies and clustering advantages that
would draw producers and suppliers to town from elsewhere in
the region. At each stage of this local development, Davenport
would broaden its trade, extend its control, bring more and
more producers and customers under its influence, and make
more people in its hinterland dependent on its actions.
The vigor and diversity of Davenport's antebellum elite's
aggressive strategies, as well as their relative success rate, are
impressive. In large part their success was due to their relative
unity. The town's location at a prime site for urban develop-
ment in the midst of a hotly contested area also supported their
actions. Antoine Leclaire, the first to arrive and, from the
returns on an extraordinary land grant, become wealthy,
emerged as the town's leading capitalist. Local plans or efforts
did not have to await the interest of outsiders to move forward.
Oligarchical economic rule, by intensifying the alignment
between personal welfare and town economic development,
thus clarified economic decisions and actions, in noticeable
contrast to many other hinterland towns across the region.
Ironically, however, the unity of the town's elite may have
allowed the assumptions of one man or a small group to go
unchecked or unexamined. The elite thus may have committed
the town's resources to an overambitious or otherwise errant
economic strategy. By putting all their hopes in one effort, the
elite tended to invest too heavily in one action and to equate its
success with town survival. Inadvertently, they may have
imperiled their economic futures by tying personal welfare too
closely, or too deeply, to the economic growth of the town.
Thus, the town's survival became equated with personal survi-
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val. In towns with more diverse strategies, each citizen's finan-
cial welfare was less connected to any one course of develop-
ment. The Davenport elite's strategic unity and clarity created
the impression that their investments were sure things. That
illusion accelerated local over-speculation during the good
times and extended the limits to which locals would go to stave
off the inevitable consequences of a failed investment when
things went bad. An unwise single investment thus acquired
the leverage to generate personal failure and ruin.
The quest for success under localist assumptions rein-
forced personal involvement with the town economy, and, in
Davenport's case, sharpened the shock of the inevitable con-
frontation with the forces of the system and deepened the pain
of the economic adjustment. It also assured that few of the elite
involved in this first strategy would survive to reorient town
economic policy to the new realities of the system. Restraint,
balance, or diversity on the part of the elite in the 1850s might
have better served the future of the town, and allowed its
inhabitants to better mediate between local and personal inter-
ests and the forces of regional development. Their inability to
do this, however, lies deeply imbedded in their particular cir-
cumstances, their assumptions, and in the distinctive character
of Davenport's society.
Towns and smaller cities and even the metropolises of the
Midwest today are still locked in a similar struggle to survive.
The struggle requires a delicate balancing act. On the one hand,
these places perceive a need to interact, be connected with, join,
or respond to the larger national and world system in order to
maintain some growth and development. On the other hand,
they do not want to allow such connections to coopt local activ-
ity, sap the dynamics of the local economy, and undercut any
local sense of community and shared social experience. Histori-
cally, this struggle has reduced many towns to colonies of fran-
chises, "imported piecemeal, but no less systematically from
distant marketing empires."'" Yet this very struggle lies at the
center of much local history, a history that cannot be told apart
from its context of regional change.
39. Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban, 127; Powers, White Town Drowsing,
39.
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